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HIS is the first issue in the distinguished sixty-year history of the
Annual Survey of Texas Law to include a chapter on Alternative
Dispute Resolution ("ADR"). The wisdom of the editors will
strike the growing population of "professional neutrals" across Texas as
confirmation of the expanding influence of mediation, arbitration, collab-
oration, and other innovative alternatives to our civil justice system. Rec-
ognition of the trend in our society to look for more efficient, more
practical, and more relevant processes to resolve disputes comes on the
heels of celebration of the twentieth anniversary of passage of the Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Procedures Act1 ("Act" or "ADR statute") by
the Texas Legislature in 1987. The Act precipitated the growth of ADR
in Texas and caused Texas to become a leader in the then nascent ADR
movement in the United States.
This article will address developments during the Survey period in me-
diation and arbitration, and will briefly summarize the status of the move-
ment to promote "collaborative law" in our civil jurisprudence.
I. MEDIATION
Although the ADR statute specifically identifies, and gives equal atten-
tion to, five procedures appropriate for court referral (Mediation, Mini-
Trial, Moderated Settlement Conference, Summary Jury Trial, and Arbi-
tration),2 the use of mediation is the "elephant in the room" compared to
the use of the other procedures. It is a safe estimate that tens of
thousands of mediations occurred across Texas in the Survey period, but
the number of arbitrations conducted was a small fraction of that num-
ber.3 With respect to the "all others" category, examples are anecdotal
* Will Pryor is a mediator and arbitrator in Dallas. Yale University, B.A., 1978;
Harvard Law School, J.D., 1981. The author gratefully acknowledges the input of Su-
zanne Duvall and Bud Silverberg in Dallas, Harry Tindall in Houston, and the immeasura-
ble talent of Ellen Smith Pryor.
1. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.001-.073 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
2. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.023-.027 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
3. In the "early days" of mediation, before most lawyers had much experience with
the use, and occasional abuse, of mediation, the process was more dynamic than it often
seems today. Mediation was fresh, it was new, and settlement rates were high. Mediation
has become so routine-many jurisdictions require it in virtually every case before to
trial-that several trends have become apparent. One positive development is the fact that
increasingly, disputes are being mediated "pre-suit." This is a result of two factors. First,
dispute resolution clauses that make mediation a condition precedent to one side suing or
filing an arbitration claim against the other have become common. Second, institutional
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and the numbers miniscule. But although much is said of mediation, and
its role in civil litigation is now pervasive, little is written, at least by our
courts. It is not an area of civil litigation about which there will likely
ever be a significant amount of judicial oversight, attention, or comment.
This is as it should be. By its nature the mediation process is intended
to be informal, lacking in any meaningful rules, and unstructured.
Courts, for the most part, seem to recognize the prudence of avoiding
sticking the judicial nose into the mediator's peace-tent. The process de-
pends upon the protections of confidentiality and informality.
Over the maturing course of experience with court-referred mediation,
there have been a few issues subject to judicial comment and participa-
tion, most notably whether a "good faith" obligation is required of medi-
ation participants, 4 and the meaning and application of "confidentiality"
and "privilege" in the ADR statute.5 But these issues were not addressed
in appellate decisions or by the Texas Legislature in the Survey period.
6
litigants, such as banks and insurance companies, often mediate pre-suit more often due to
an overall generally positive experience with mediation in recent years. On a negative
note, increasingly lawyers are caught up in the "routineness" of the process. Such lawyers,
who do not take mediation seriously enough, often fail to provide the mediator with pre-
mediation submissions, urging that the joint session of the parties be avoided altogether
(which classically is the first step in the process); and insist that the mediation be scheduled
for only a "half day" in circumstances in which most experienced neutrals would agree that
a "full day" would have been more appropriate.
4. See Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 251-52 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1992, no writ) (holding that the Texas ADR statute allows a court to require the parties to
mediate, but does not allow a court to order the parties to make good faith efforts to
settle).
5. Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The
Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 37 (1986) (providing an early but still
helpful summary of the arguments for protecting the confidentiality of all mediation com-
munication). Dean Ed Sherman, one of the authors of the ADR statute and a legend in
Texas ADR lore, once described section 154.073 of the Texas statute as "perhaps the
broadest ADR confidentiality provision in the country." Edward F. Sherman, Confidenti-
ality in ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues Arising from the Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L.
REV. 541, 542 (1997). With certain narrow exceptions, "a communication relating to the
subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by a participant in an alternative dis-
pute resolution procedure, whether before or after the institution of formal judicial pro-
ceedings, is confidential, is not subject to disclosure, and may not be used as evidence
against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding." TEX. Civ. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) (Vernon 2005). Any record of an ADR proceeding is confi-
dential and neither the participants nor the neutral can be compelled to testify as to any
aspect of the proceeding. § 154.073(b).
6. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated
a Uniform Mediation Act in 2001 ("UMA"). UNIF. MEDIATION AcT §§ 1-17 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/archives/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm. The UMA
has been adopted in nine states and the District of Columbia, and is presently under con-
sideration in two states. It is unlikely that it will ever be adopted in Texas. The ADR
community in Texas rose up in opposition to the UMA in 2002, primarily because of con-
cerns that its confidentiality protections were weaker than those in the Texas ADR statute
and due to the UMA's relative complexity. See Brian Shannon, Twenty Years of Confiden-
tiality Under the Texas ADR Act, 16 ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTIONS, Summer/Fall 2007, at 30.
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A. ENFORCING (MEDIATED) SETrLEMENT AGREEMENTS
The El Paso Court of Appeals lifted the spirits of practicing mediators
everywhere when it enforced a mostly hand-written, bare-bones mediated
settlement agreement in E.P. Towne Center Partners, L.P. v. Chopsticks,
Inc.7 This commercial landlord-tenant dispute involved an alleged
breach, by the former tenant, of an agreement achieved at a mediation of
an underlying dispute (over whether the landlord had breached an exclu-
sivity clause). The simple agreement, typical of mediated agreements, did
not contain a lot of bells and whistles. The agreement called for the for-
mer tenant to make certain scheduled payments, for the parties to exe-
cute mutual releases, for confidentiality, and for dismissal of the lawsuit.
The payment obligation was to be secured by an agreed judgment. The
agreement did not address the result if one of the installment payments
were returned by the bank due to insufficient funds. So, naturally, that is
what happened.
In a decision which admittedly has more to do with contract law than
the ADR statute, the court rejected the argument that the mediated
agreement failed for lack of an "essential term" and found that the land-
lord was entitled to seek enforcement of the agreed judgment.8
The importance of the opinion may be that it is an example of one
court confirming the validity of a mediated agreement, a simple agree-
ment typical of the agreements routinely achieved, and reduced to writ-
ing, in the actual practice of mediation.9
II. ARBITRATION
"In considering referral to arbitration, the question is not which forum is
quicker, cheaper, or more convenient, but which one the parties picked."10
For centuries arbitration was a creature of maritime and insurance dis-
putes, working its way into more modern jurisprudence during the rise of
organized labor and the implementation of collective bargaining agree-
ments. The practice of inserting arbitration clauses into virtually every
kind of contract involving virtually every kind of relationship began to
7. 242 S.W.3d 117, 120-23 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 2007, no pet.).
8. Id. at 123.
9. Counsel typically seeks to reduce mediated agreements to writing, signed by theparties, before the participants are dismissed so as to not run afoul of the requirements ofRule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and to avoid any chance of one of the partieshaving a change of heart. In practice, however, almost all mediated settlement agreements
contemplate that the parties will execute more elaborate, and more detailed, settlementdocuments. Often the expression is something like: "Notwithstanding that the parties to
this mediated agreement contemplate the execution of more elaborate settlement docu-
ments, the parties intend to be bound by this agreement." No such provision was includedin the agreement at issue in the opinion, and notwithstanding the apparent need for suchdocuments, including the releases to be executed and an agreed form of judgment securingpayment, no more elaborate documents were apparently ever executed. Had there been
more elaborate documents, it seems likely that a "bell and whistle," a detailed "notice and
opportunity to cure" provision, would have been included, which would have spared the
tenant the adverse ruling.
10. In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co., 235 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2007) (emphasis added).
2008]
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explode in the 1970's and 1980's. Product manufacturers, homebuilders,
banks, insurers, employers, landlords, and in short, anyone with a concern
that litigation was just too expensive and too inefficient, began to turn to
arbitration as a means of controlling litigation costs and limiting expo-
sure. With the stroke of a pen at the bottom of almost any type of con-
tract, "plaintiff personal injury lawyers," "frivolous lawsuits," and
"runaway juries" could be avoided in favor of a more appropriate and
more business-friendly environment.
The courts, reflecting the political winds of society and as a pragmatic
method of dealing with burgeoning dockets, began to reconsider and re-
verse the concerns of earlier decades that arbitration threatened due pro-
cess, that fine print arbitration clauses were void as adhesion contracts, or
that arbitration rules were prejudicial or discriminatory in some other
manner to segments of the population.
The Survey period appellate decisions reflect the current climate of ac-
ceptance and acquiescence by the courts. In a landslide, appellate deci-
sions in Texas confirm arbitration awards rather than set them aside, and
affirm trial court orders compelling arbitration.
A. WHEN MUST ARBITRATION BE COMPELLED BY A COURT?
Courts confront motions to compel arbitration whenever an aggrieved
party files a lawsuit and the other party seeks to enforce a contractual
obligation to and realize the perceived advantages of resolution of the
dispute through arbitration. In the Survey period, we appropriately have
decisions to note in the context of employment disputes, as well as con-
sumer claims, two of the most popular areas of current arbitration
practice.
1. Employment
Employers in Texas and across the United States have moved aggres-
sively in recent years to channel any and all disputes arising out of em-
ployment relationships, including federal, statutory claims for race,
gender or other forms of discrimination, and ERISA matters, to
arbitration.
An employee argued that her "economic duress" when signing her em-
ployment agreement should excuse her from having to arbitrate, rather
than litigate, her claims in In re RLS Legal Solutions, LLC.11 But the
Texas Supreme Court found that such a defense must relate to the arbi-
tration provision specifically, and not to the contract as a whole, and that
the "plaintiff's only evidence is that she was under duress to sign an em-
ployment agreement containing an arbitration provision; there is no evi-
dence that she was under duress specifically to agree to arbitration apart
from the other provisions of the agreement.
12




Employers have found that even in the at-will employment context, an
arbitration clause in an employee handbook, with an acknowledgement
of receipt signed by the employee, is valid and binding. In D.R. Horton,
Inc. v. Brooks,1 3 the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals re-jected the employee's arguments that, because her employment was at
will, the arbitration agreement was illusory or that it was either procedur-
ally or substantively unconscionable.1 4 In doing so the court followed an
unwavering string of Texas Supreme Court authority in recent years.15
2. Consumer
In re U.S. Home Corp.16 is a somewhat tidy summary of the appellate
view of arbitration clauses in Texas. Two couples, dissatisfied with the
new homes they purchased, sought to avoid the arbitration clauses in
their contracts by raising seven contractual defenses. The trial court
agreed that five of the defenses were valid. The Texas Supreme Court
disagreed and mandated that the dispute be arbitrated. 17
The couples argued that the arbitration clauses were adhesion contracts
and thus unconscionable; that the agreements were procured by fraud;
that a failure of mutual consideration existed; that arbitration would be
unduly burdensome and costly; that mediation was a condition precedent
to arbitration; that certain individual defendants, U.S. Home Corp.("U.S. Home") agents and employees, were not signatories; and that apending appeal of a class certification order rendered an order compel-
ling arbitration inappropriate.18 The supreme court summarily consid-
ered each contractual argument and was summarily dismissive of each
and every one. 19
Again highlighting that these disputes are largely disputes over con-
tract interpretation, the Texas Supreme Court demonstrated in In re
Bank One, N.A. how far it is willing to go to determine that a mere refer-
ence to an arbitration clause may be sufficient to compel arbitration. 20 A
customer sought to litigate with Bank One, N.A., but the Texas Supreme
Court found that an arbitration agreement incorporated by reference on
the account signature card signed by the customer's representative was
sufficient to constitute a binding and enforceable agreement to
arbitrate. 21
A decision by the Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals fol-
lowed the mainstream of Texas authorities, which rarely set aside any
13. 207 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
14. Id. at 867-70.
15. See id. at 867 (citing In re Dallas Peterbilt, Ltd., LLP, 196 S.W.3d 161, 162 (Tex.2006) and In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2002)).
16. 236 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. 2007).
17. Id. at 765.
18. Id. at 764-65.
19. See id. at 764-65.




challenged arbitration agreement. In In re Jim Walter Homes, home buy-
ers argued that the arbitration clause did not apply to a claim for personal
injuries.22 Yet the court held that even tort claims fell with the scope of
the broad arbitration clause, which required arbitration of "claims arising
out of or relating to" their home purchase.
23
B. TRIAL COURT DISCRETION
So if the courts are going to routinely enforce arbitration clauses, do
trial courts have any discretion in the timing of their orders compelling
arbitration, either in delaying the order in general, or in ordering the par-
ties to mediation in advance of ruling? The answer is a clear "no" on
both issues in two cases.
In In re The Shredder Co., L.L.C., an employer had filed a motion to
compel arbitration, and the trial court took six months to rule on the
motion.2 4 The El Paso Court of Appeals held that the trial court had
abused its discretion by failing to rule on the motion to compel. 25 "Even
if a party contests the validity and scope of the arbitration agreement, a
trial court abuses its discretion by delaying a ruling on whether the agree-
ment is enforceable until after discovery is complete.
26
A somewhat similar issue arose in In re Heritage Building Systems, Inc.
when a trial judge decided to refer a case to mediation before deciding
the defendant's motion to compel arbitration.27 At the trial level, the
plaintiff had argued that, notwithstanding the arbitration clause, Texas's
policy of encouraging settlement gave the trial judge the authority to send
the parties to mediation before ruling on the motion to compel arbitra-
tion. The Beaumont Court of Appeals rejected this argument. As the
court explained, "[t]he arbitrator may, or may not, choose to require me-
diation. However, the trial court's ordering the parties to mediation un-
dermines the expectation of the parties that their dispute will be resolved
by proceedings directed by an arbitrator.
12 8
The message of Texas appellate decisions is clear: arbitration provisions
are going to be enforced in almost any circumstance and, when requested,
trial courts shall not delay the referral of the dispute. But another issue
arises having to do with when parties to an arbitration agreement can
compel "non-parties" to arbitrate.
22. In re Jim Walter Homes, 207 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2006, no pet.).
23. Id. at 895.
24. In re The Shredder Co., L.L.C., 225 S.W.3d 676, 678-79 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2006,
no pet.).
25. Id. at 679.
26. Id.
27. In re Heritage Bldg. Sys., Inc., 185 S.W.3d 539 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no
pet.).
28. Id. at 543.
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C. WHICH PARTIES CAN BE COMPELLED To ARBITRATE?
In a variety of contexts, a party to an arbitration agreement will some-
times seek to have a "non-party" or "non-signatory" made subject to the
same proceeding. Conversely, there are cases in which non-parties and
non-signatories seek the presumed advantages of arbitration in proceed-
ings against parties. This latter scenario occurred in In Re Merrill Lynch
Trust Co., FSB.29 A Merrill Lynch customer sought to avoid the arbitra-
tion clause in his investment services contract with Merrill Lynch. Rather
than name Merrill Lynch as defendant, the customer filed suit against the
Merrill Lynch employee/advisor and two Merrill Lynch-related affiliated
entities. Neither the advisor nor the related entities were technically par-
ties or signatories to the contract containing the arbitration.
As to the advisor defendant, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff's claims were "in substance against Merrill Lynch," because the
advisor had been acting as agent of Merrill Lynch and within the scope of
that relationship. 30 Yet the supreme court added that employees cannot
always invoke their employer's arbitration agreement. "When actions
outside the course of employment cannot be attributed to an employer,
the latter would have no need to invoke its arbitration protections....
[A]rbitrability turns on the substance of a claim, not artful pleading. ' 31
The supreme court then addressed the claims against the two affiliated
entities. The supreme court held that these entities could not invoke an
arbitration clause. 32 First, these companies had their own agreements
with the plaintiff and these agreements did not include an arbitration
clause. 33 Second, the supreme court found that no theory tied the affili-
ates to the Merrill Lynch arbitration agreement. In general, a "corporate
relationship" is not sufficient to "bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration
agreement. '34 Thus, the claims against the affiliates could be litigated.35
The Merrill Lynch case involved non-parties and non-signatories who
sought to be respondents to an arbitration proceeding rather than de-
fendants in a lawsuit. A similar scenario was presented to the Texas Su-
preme Court in Meyer v. WMCO-GP, L.L.C.36 Party A contracted to
purchase Party B, a car dealership. The contract had an arbitration
clause. When Ford Motor Company (Non-Party C) received notice of the
proposed sale, it exercised its right of first refusal and assigned the right
to Non-Party D; thus, Party B was required to sell its business to Non-
Party D. Party A filed suit against Non-Parties C and D and Non-Parties
C and D sought to compel arbitration relying on the clause in the contract
between Party A and Party B.
29. 235 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2007).
30. Id. at 189.
31. Id. at 190.
32. Id. at 191.
33. Id. at 191.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 211 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. 2006).
2008]
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The trial court overruled the motion to compel. But the Texas Su-
preme Court reversed and ruled that, in some circumstances, a person
can be equitably estopped from refusing arbitration. 37 This can happen
when "a person seeks by his claim 'to derive a direct benefit from the
contract containing the arbitration provision."' 38 In this case, Party A "is
trying to have it both ways: it is asserting rights that it would not have but
for the [purchase and sale agreement], but refusing to honor its agree-
ment to arbitrate disputes over those rights."'39 The supreme court thus
held that Party A was equitably estopped from refusing arbitration.40
In Re Kaplan Higher Education Corporation4' provides another exam-
ple of a party seeking to avoid arbitration by naming only non-parties or
non-signatories to the arbitration contract. Here forty-five students in a
vocational college sued for fraudulent inducement. The students signed
an enrollment agreement with the college, which included an arbitration
clause. In the suit for fraudulent inducement, the students initially named
multiple defendants and the defendants moved for arbitration. The stu-
dents then dropped all but two defendants, both of which were non-signa-
tories to the enrollment agreement. Yet, the Texas Supreme Court
required arbitration, reasoning that the students' fraudulent inducement
claims did "arise out of and relate to their enrollment agreements. '42
A more common scenario occurs when a party to an arbitration seeks
to cast the net of those who can be compelled to join in the proceeding as
broadly as possible. This was the case in In Re Ford Motor Co.,43 before
the San Antonio Court of Appeals. The arbitration clause appeared in
the auto sales contract between the seller-Gillespie Motor Co.-and the
buyers-husband and wife. Tragically, the wife was later killed in a roll-
over accident involving the purchased vehicle. When the decedant's es-
tate, as well as the children and the parents of the decedant, all "non-
parties" and "non-signatories" to the sales contract, sought to litigate
claims against Ford Motor Co. ("Ford"), Ford moved to compel arbitra-
tion. Because the claims were captioned "Breach of Warranty" and were
alleged to arise "by and through the sale of the Ford Expedition," the
claims were essentially "based on a contract" through which the claim-
ants sought to derive a "direct benefit. '44 "[A] litigant who sues based on
a contract subjects him or herself to the contract's terms. '45
Viewed collectively, these opinions leave little doubt that the courts are
taking and will continue to take an expansive view of who can be com-
pelled to arbitrate, rather than litigate, disputes. Increasingly, non-parties
37. Id. at 305.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 308.
40. Id.
41. 235 S.W.3d 206 (Tex. 2007).
42. Id. at 208-09.
43. 220 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.)




and non-signatories will be arbitrating disputes, whether as petitioners or
respondents.
D. WHEN CAN ARBITRATION AWARDS BE SET ASIDE BY A COURT?
To logically conclude an overview of judicial interaction with arbitra-
tion issues, we move on to examine the standards of review and the cir-
cumstances in which the courts will set aside or vacate arbitration award.
We have two notable opinions to examine. Both are opinions of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and technically involve the interpretation and
application of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). However, both
opinions are consistent with the reasoning and holdings of Texas appel-
late courts in recent years, and are likely to be deemed instructive and
authoritative by Texas courts in the years to come. So, their review here
seems appropriate.
In the context of commercial arbitration, it is not uncommon for com-
plex contractual arrangements to include specific provisions pertaining to
the scope of any contractual arbitration process, should such a proceeding
become necessary. In Apache Bohai Corp. LDC v. Texaco China BV,46
the Fifth Circuit addressed Apache Bohai Corp's ("Apache") request
that it vacate a seventy-one million dollar arbitration award in favor of a
Texaco entity. The arbitration agreement specifically directed that New
York law apply and that the proceedings be conducted pursuant to Amer-
ican Arbitration Association procedures. In addition, the agreement in-
cluded an "exculpatory clause" to the effect that, "notwithstanding any
other provision," under no circumstance could the parties ever be liable
to each other for consequential losses or damages.47 Apache, quite un-
derstandably, took exception to the arbitrator's invalidation of the excul-
patory clause under New York law, and his award of consequential
damages.
The circuit court affirmed the arbitrator's award.48 In so doing, the
court affirmed a long line of "standard of review" opinions. "[Tihe re-
view of the underlying award is 'exceedingly deferential."' 49 Awards are
only to be vacated "for certain statutory grounds, including 'where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers,' or under narrow common law excep-
tions, such as [a showing of] 'manifest disregard for the law' or [where the
decision is] 'contrary to public policy." 50 Importantly, "[a]n award may
not be set aside for a mere mistake of fact or law."' 51
One final brick in the wall of enforcement of arbitration agreements,
and the preservation of the near inviolability of arbitration awards, was
the en banc opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Positive Software Solutions, Inc.
46. 480 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2007).
47. Id. at 401 n.1.
48. Id. at 400.





v. New Century Mortgage Corp.52 At issue in the case was the standard of
"evident partiality" found in the Federal Arbitration Act. 53 The appeal
arose from an arbitration in which the arbitrator had failed to disclose
that, in unrelated litigation seven years prior to the arbitration, both the
arbitrator and his former firm, Arnold White & Durkee, had briefly been
co-counsel for the same party, Intel Corp ("Intel"), along with one of the
lawyers for New Century Mortgage Corp. ("New Century") and her law
firm, Susman Godfrey, L.L.P.
The district court vacated the award given this failure to disclose "'a
significant prior relationship with New Century's counsel." 54 The Fifth
Circuit noted that, although the arbitrator's and counsel's names, for a
time, were on the same pleadings, there was no indication that they had
jointly participated in any meetings, hearings, telephone calls, deposi-
tions, or trials. The circuit court noted, in addition, that the Intel repre-
sentation involved six different lawsuits and at least thirty-four lawyers.
In interpreting the standard of evident partiality, the court extensively
explored the various plurality opinions from a 1968 U.S. Supreme Court
decision addressing the standard.5 5 The Fifth Circuit endorsed the more
narrow and practical view of Justice White's concurring opinion. In the
Fifth Circuit's view, "[w]hile supporting a policy of disclosure by arbitra-
tors to enhance the selection process, Justice White also concluded, in a
practical vein, that an arbitrator 'cannot be expected to provide the par-
ties with his complete and unexpurgated business biography'. . . . [Justice
White's opinion] fully envisions upholding awards when arbitrators fail to
disclose insubstantial relationships. 56
According to the Fifth Circuit, given this more "practical" and narrow
view of the standard, the Federal Arbitration Act does not mandate the
"extreme remedy of vacatur" for "nondisclosure of a trivial past associa-
tion."'57 Rather, "[t]he draconian remedy of vacatur is only warranted
upon nondisclosure that involves a significant compromising relation-
ship."'58 This is a significant decision, outlining a high bar for establishing
grounds for vacatur.
III. A NOTE ABOUT COLLABORATIVE LAW
Anything beyond academic theorizing about resolving disputes in a
"collaborative process" appears to have surfaced in 1990, through a small
52. 476 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied.
53. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2006) (stating that "the United States court in and for the
district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration.., where there was evident partiality or corrup-
tion in the arbitrators").
54. Positive Software, 476 F.3d at 280 (quoting Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New
Century Mortgage Corp., 337 F. supp. 2d 862, 865 (N.D. Tex. 2004)).
55. See id. at 281-32 (citing Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393
U.S. 145, 149-52 (1968)).
56. Id. at 281-82 (citing Commonwealth, 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 279, 281.
58. Id. at 286.
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group of lawyers in Minnesota who created a collaborative "institute. '59
In 2000, the concept was introduced in Texas by Dallas lawyers Larry
Hance and John McShane, and in 2001 the Texas legislature amended the
Texas Family Code to add collaborative law procedures. 60
What is collaborative law? It is a dispute-resolution process in which
the participants, including counsel, sign a "participation agreement," in
which they formally commit to cooperation in disclosure and discovery,
and the lawyers promise to withdraw from representation if the dispute
eventually must be litigated.61 Perhaps the single greatest virtue of these
commitments is that it creates a unique incentive for the lawyers to assist
with compromise and resolution, as opposed to continued confrontation
and litigation.
Though still in the background, and still virtually exclusively utilized in
family law matters, the collaborative law movement in Texas is an area of
ADR that seems bound to succeed and expand.62 In 2005, and again in
2007, Texas collaborative lawyers pushed for passage of collaborative law
provisions similar to those in the Texas Family Code into the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, to make the process applicable in general
civil matters.63
CONCLUSION
The recent efforts of promoters of collaborative law, as well as the ef-
forts of others to facilitate the expansion of mediation and arbitration,
point to the irreproachable goal of those in our society to find "a better
way." For many, the courts, the legal profession, and the judiciary, as
well as the constitutional, statutory, and common law rights that they
were created to protect and enforce, are all parts of a system that has
becoming increasingly irrelevant. For those to whom our current civil jus-
tice system now represents a grossly inefficient and costly mechanism for
conflict resolution, the increasing use of mediation, arbitration, and col-
laboration for all types of disputes will be as beneficial to society as it is
inevitable.
59. See Lawrence R. Maxwell, Jr., The Development of Collaborative Law, ALTERNA-
TIVE RESOLUTIONS, Summer/Fall 2007, at 22 (providing a very helpful history of the inven-
tion of collaborative law, as well as its development in Texas).
60. Id. at 23.
61. Robert P. Wildau, Making Sense of Collaborative Law, COLLABORATIVE INSTI-
TUTE OF TEXAS, February 2003, http://www.collablawtexas.com/article-making-sense-of
collaborativejlaw.cfm (last visited Aug. 18, 2008).
62. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, February 2008
Interim Draft, COLLABORATIVE LAW AcT, http://www.nccusl.org[Update/Committee
SearchResults.aspx?committee=279. Assuming eventual passage of such a statute by the
Commissioners, its consideration by all fifty state legislatures will ensue. Eventually, pas-
sage in some states is reasonably foreseeable.
63. See H.B. 205, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005). In 2005, the ADR section of the
State Bar of Texas supported the legislation, and included support among its 2007 legisla-
tive proposals. Maxwell, supra note 59, at 23.
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